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V

REQUISITES

OF A VALID JUDGMENT
GEOFFREY

C.

HAZARD,

Professor of Law, Yale Law School,

New Haven, Connecticut
cerns the notice that was afforded
and is taken in the original action, it
efore
a
court
properly
may
undertake anrequireadjudi- must be made at the threshold of the
cation,
ments must
be met.three
First, the per- proceeding; a litigant who responds
sons whose interests are to be ad- on the merits or otherwise particijudicated must be given adequate pates without properly having obnotice of the proceeding and an op- jected to the notice is deemed to
portunity to be heard. Second, the have waived the objection. The
court must have territorial jurisdic- same is true of an objection concerntion of the controversy. A court's ing the court's territorial jurisdicterritorial jurisdiction is limited by tion. E.g., Everitt v. Everitt, 4
the United States Constitution and N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891, 171
may further be limited by statute or N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958). See generally
rule of court. Third, the court must Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction;
have authority to adjudicate the type Article 2031 B, the Texas "Long
of controversy presented to it. This Arm" JurisdictionStatute; and the
authority is generally referred to as Appearance To Challenge Jurisdicsubject matter jurisdiction and at tion in Texas and Elsewhere, 42
times as competence or competency. Tex. L. Rev. 279 (1964). An objecThe failure of any of these re- tion to the court's subject matter
quirements is a ground for objection jurisdiction may also be asserted as
to the maintenance of the proceed- a preliminary matter. However, the
ing in the court in which it has been generally recognized rule is that
brought. When the objection con- such an objection may also be raised
This article is the Introductory Note to Chapter 2 of the American Law Institute's

Tentative Draft No. 5 of the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS.
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at any time before final judgment or
on appeal from the judgment. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan

Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
If an objection to notice or to
territorial jurisdiction is raised in the
original action and is adjudicated,
the determination is thereafter conclusive. Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.

522 (1931). With qualifications, the
same principle applies to an objection concerning the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court. Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). The
principle involved sometimes is
stated to be that a court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.
A more difficult problem is
whether the lack of any of these
basic requirements can be asserted
after rendition of the judgment. In
this connection it is necessary to
make two distinctions. One is between a judgment rendered after an
appearance of some kind and a
judgment that has been rendered
upon default. The other is between
the requirements of notice and of
territorial jurisdiction, on the one
hand, and the requirement of subject matter jurisdiction on the other
hand.
PPEARANCE AND DEFAULT

0 When an appearance
has been made and the
action then goes to judgment, objections to adequacy of notice or to
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territorial jurisdiction may not
thereafter be taken. This results
from the legal consequences of appearance. An appearance may have
the purpose, or include the purpose,
of asserting an objection to notice or
to territorial jurisdiction. If the appearance is made in conformity with
the procedure for making such an
objection, it does not constitute a
submission to the authority of the
court. E.g., DragorShipping Corp.
v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d

241 (9th Cir. 1967). But it does result
in tendering the matters of notice
and territorial jurisdiction to the
court in which the action has been
brought. The court's decision of
those matters thereby becomes a
matter adjudicated and is conclusive
under the rules of res judicata.
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling

Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
Furthermore, if an appearance is
made in such a way as to constitute
admission of the authority of the
court, it is called a general appearance. E.g., Cuellar v. Cuellar, 406

S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
Such an appearance itself terminates the opportunity to raise the
questions of notice and territorial
jurisdiction. Hence, when a defendant appears in an action, whatever
the form of his appearance, the
questions of notice and territorial
jurisdiction will have been resolved
before entry of judgment.
The situation is quite different
when judgment is by default for
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want of appearance. By hypothesis,
the defendant has appeared neither
to object to notice orjurisdiction nor
to defend on the merits. Yet even
after final judgment he may object to
the adequacy of notice or to territorial jurisdiction.The objection may
be made when a suit is brought upon
the judgment in a court other than
that in which the judgment was
rendered. See, e.g., Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871
(1959). It may also be made through
a motion or other application for
relief in the court where the judgment was rendered. See, e.g.,
United States v. Karahalias, 205
F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953). Thus, only
when the judgment is by default is
there ordinarily a possibility that the
requirements of notice and territorial jurisdiction will be challenged
through an attack on the judgment
after it has been rendered.
The rules governing objections to
subject matterjurisdiction in certain
respects parallel those governing
objections to adequacy of notice and
territorial jurisdiction. Thus, an objection to subject matter jurisdiction
may be raised in the original action,
either at the threshold of the litigation or later on. If the objection is
raised, the determination of the objection is generally conclusive in
subsequent litigation. Similarly, if
judgment is by default, the question
of subject matter jurisdiction ordinarily may be raised by subsequent
attack on the judgment, much as
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objections to adequacy of notice and
territorial jurisdiction may so be
asserted. Cf. Rose v. Eliott, 70
F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). The
divergence in treatment of the requirement of subject matterjurisdiction arises when judgment has been
rendered after an appearance but
the question was not raised during
the course of the proceedings.
It was formerly the rule that the
court's subject matter jurisdiction
could still be challenged in a subsequent attack on the judgment. See
generally Note, Filling the Void:
Judicial Power and Jurisdictional
Attacks on Judgments, 87 Yale L.J.
164 (1977). The underlying proposition was that a judgment of a court
that lacks subject matter jurisdiction
is a legal nullity. The modern rule is
that such a post-judgment attack on
the court's subject matter jurisdiction may be made only in impelling
circumstances that justify lifting the
rule of bar.

W

ALIDITY * In traditional
terminology, the three re-

quirements that must exist
before a court may properly undertake an adjudication-notice, territorial jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction-are said to determine the validity of the judgment.
Correlatively, in the absence of any
of these requirements, the judgment
is said to be void. This terminology
implies that a proceeding with respect to which one of the three
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requirements is lacking is vulnerable to attack not only during its
pendency but also-because it is
void-at any time thereafter.
Up to a point, this is correct. The
questions of notice, territorial jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction have special procedural status
in that, unlike other defenses, they
are not ordinarily foregone by default in the original action. Thus, it is
accurate to say that a default judgment rendered without adequate
notice, or by a court lacking the
required territorial connection to the
matter under adjudication, or by a
court lacking subject matter jurisdiction, is void, in that it is vulnerable to attack in a subsequent proceeding. On the other hand, if the
judgment is not by default, when it
has become final it is invulnerable to
attack on the ground of inadequacy
of notice or lack of territorial jurisdiction. Ordinarily, it is also invulnerable to attack for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Yet even when a judgment is
subject to attack on one of these
grounds, it does not follow that it
may be disregarded for all legal
purposes. The implications of the
concept of voidness vary according
to procedural context. Thus, in connection with appellate review of
determinations that are not otherwise reviewable, the concept is
sometimes used as a basis for issuance of writs of mandamus and
prohibition to control abuses of au-

APRIL 15

thority by a subordinate tribunal.
E.g., Them tron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336
(1976). In connection with judgments imposing incarceration, the
concept of voidness has been used
to justify post-judgment relief
through the writ of habeas corpus.
E.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963). In these and other contexts, the judgment may be held void
in that it may be opened for redetermination of one or another of the issues supporting it. But the judgment
may retain validity for the purpose
of immunizing action taken by a party or a third person in reliance on the
judgment. E.g., Nuernberger v.
State, 41 N.Y.2d 111, 359 N.E.2d
412, 390 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1976).
Hence, in a variety of situations, a
judgment may be treated as valid for
some purposes, and void for others.
Even the question whether a controversy that has gone to judgment
should be opened for relitigation
may be answered one way when
interests of reliance on the judgment
have intervened and another when
they have not.
In view of the qualifying specifications that must be introduced in
order appropriately to use the terms
valid and void with reference to a
judgment, these terms have limited
utility. It may be said in general
terms that ajudgment is valid only if
it is based upon adequate notice and
is rendered by a court having territorial jurisdiction and invested with
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authority to adjudicate the type of
controversy involved. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the
terms valid and void state a result
instead of explaining it. They are
shorthand expressions, useful if
carefully employed, for saying
whether or not a judgment is so
affected by a fundamental infirmity
that the infirmity can be raised even
after judgment.
ERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

o The term "territorial
jurisdiction" refers to the
connection between the territorial
authority of the court and the action
that has been brought before it.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569
(1977). Courts are constituted by
governments, including national
governments within the international community and state governments within our federal union.
The governments themselves have
an authority that is defined by reference to their legal boundaries or
territorial limits. Hence, the authority of the courts constituted by them
is correspondingly defined, as least
in part, in territorial terms.
Historically, the territorial jurisdiction of courts was based upon the
presence of a person or thing within
the legal boundaries of the government that created the court. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
When a person was within those
boundaries, jurisdiction described
as in personam could be exercised
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over him; when a thing was within
those boundaries, jurisdiction described as in rem or quasi in rem

could be exercised to determine
interests in the thing.
Presence of the person or thing
remains of significance in the law of
territorial jurisdiction. Generally
speaking, the rule remains that enforcement of a judgment may be
effectuated only by executive officials such as the sheriff or marshal of
the government in which~ the enforcement is undertaken. Hence,
outside the territorial limits of a
court's jurisdiction, the coercive effectiveness of its judgment depends
upon the judgment being given recognition by the authorities of
another government. This recognition may be given under a principle
of comity, by virtue of legal provisions such as the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, or
the terms of a treaty between nations concerning reciprocal recognition of judgments. This means that
for enforcement purposes outside
its territorial limits, a court's judgment, even though final, is not of its
own legal authority the last word in
providing legal redress in the matter
adjudicated. Correlatively, the practical effectiveness of a judgment
against someone or something outside the court's territorial jurisdiction depends upon cooperation of
another government.
The presence of a person or thing
remains of significance in the law of
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territorial jurisdiction for yet
another reason. Governments share
the purpose of assuring that a party
with a valid legal claim can find
some forum in which to obtain effective redress. Failure to provide legal
remedies for wholly domestic disputes can lead to civic demoralization and disturbance of the peace
through resort to self-help; the same
thing can happen concerning disputes whose incidents occur in the
territory of more than one government. Broadly speaking, it is therefore a concern of every government
to provide a forum for redress if no
better forum can be found, i.e., a
forum of last resort.
The point of last resort is reached
if the defendant, by ignoring or
avoiding process addressed to him
or his property, has made it necessary to use actual coercion to exact
redress from him. Actual coercion, in the form of arrest of his
person or seizure of his property, is
effectuated by executive officials
and not by the judiciary itself. But
such officials ordinarily are authorized to employ arrest or seizure
in a civil action only under authority
of directions emanating from a court
created by the government by which
they were appointed. When redress
requires immediate use of such
coercive measures, it therefore has
to be sought in a court within whose
territorial limits is located the person or thing to which the coercive
measures are to be applied.

APRIL 15

This is an explication of Holmes'
famous dictum that "[tihe foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power." McDonald v. Mabee, 243

U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Jurisdiction
based on power over the person or
thing is thus justified at least in the
extreme case where the moral authority of the judicial process is
ignored or denied. Historically, the
extreme case was perhaps not an
unusual case. In any event, before
the development of modern transportation and communications, the
presence of a person or thing within
a court's territorial jurisdiction usually coincided with the fact that
transactions involving the person or
thing also occurred there. Presence
thus signified not only the immediate availability of executive
power to enforce a judgment, but
also, in the usual case, that the
transaction in suit had some connection with the place where it was
brought.
In the course of the last century,
the significance of presence of person or thing as a basis of territorial
jurisdiction has diminished. Courts
are far readier than in the past to
give recognition to judgments of
sister jurisdictions without going
behind them to reexamine the
merits. Of course, since the adoption of the Constitution, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause has required each state to recognize the
judgment of a sister state. It seems
fair to say, however, that the Full
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Faith and Credit Clause is now not ity of immediately enforcing it
merely accepted by the states but through local officials. Correspondappreciated by them as providing ingly, the presence of the person or
vital legal support for the efficacy of thing against whom such enforcetheir own judgments in an increas- ment measures may be taken has
ingly mobile society. This is evi- become of diminished significance
denced in the attitude of state courts in the principles of territorial juristoward recognition of sister state diction.
judgments that have been held to be
In this perspective, the developoutside the purview of the Full Faith ment of the modern law of territorial
and Credit Clause, notably child jurisdiction may be better comcustody decrees. See, e.g., Ferreira prehended. In International Shoe
v. Ferreira,9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310

304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973).
Moreover, a similar attitude is
shown toward the judgments of
other countries, where the principle
of comity appears to be becoming
infused with a comparable firmness.

(1945), the Supreme Court held that
presence is not necessary for the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction,
stating that the significant question
was whether, in the context of our
federal system of government, the
Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia defendant has "minimum contacts
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435
(3d Cir. 197 1), cert. denied, 405 U.S.

...

such that the maintenance of the

suit does not offend 'traditional no1017 (1972). Still further, the proce- tions of fair play and substantial
dure of registry of judgments is justice.'" 326 U.S. at 316. Under
being more widely adopted. In this the minimum contacts principle,
procedure, a judgment of one juris- presence is not irrelevant, especially
diction can be transformed into a when the forum within whose terrilocally enforceable judgment tory the defendant is present is the
through a simple summary action. only one that can provide the plainSee Uniform Enforcement of For- tiff redress. See, e.g., Perkins v.
eign Judgments Act.
Benquet Consolidated Mining Co.,
The cumulative effect of these 342 U.S. 437 (1952). But under the
developments is that a judgment of regime of International Shoe, the
one court system now generally will courts, while continuing to recogreceive full recognition elsewhere nize presence as a basis for in perwith a minimum of hesitation and sonam jurisdiction, have given inprocedural complication. In the or- creasing weight to the relationship
dinary interstate case, the practical between the forum and the transacefficacy of a judgment has thus tion in suit.
become independent of the capabilWith the law of jurisdiction hav-
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ing assumed this posture, the Supreme Court announced its decision

APRIL 15
OTICE

* Under the doc-

trine of Pennoyer v. Neff,

possibly excepting cases involving
attachment of real property, may
not be exercised merely by virtue of
the local situs of the seized property. Compare the opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens, concur-

95 U.S. 714 (1877), the
problem of notice in actions in personam largely solved itself. The
presence of the defendant within the
court's territorial boundaries was a
sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction over him. Common law procedure required that the defendant
be found by a process-server conveying a summons, which effectuated notice. However, the law of
service of process evolved to include various forms of substituted
service, such as delivery to the
defendant's agent or to a person at
the defendant's place of business or
abode. As it did, there was some
uncertainty about whether all forms
of substituted service should be regarded as equivalent to personal
service in their notice-giving effect.

ring in Shaffer v. Heitner. Very

Compare, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti,

likely, it means that all exercises of
jurisdiction based on presence of
property will require either that the
transaction in suit have some relation to the forum or that there be
some special justification for the
plaintiffs use of the remedy of prejudgment seizure of defendant's
property. Compare the line of deci-

272 U.S. 13 (1928) (service on
statutory "agent" of non-resident
motorist without notice to the
motorist himself held to be invalid),

in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S.Ct. 2569

( 1977). That case held that the exercise of jurisdiction over intangible
property was governed by the principle of minimum contacts and

hence the local presence of the thing
was not itself a sufficient basis of
attachment jurisdiction. This is the
first Supreme Court decision making minimum contacts not only a

sufficient basis for jurisdiction, but
also a necessary condition.
The portent of this decision is
difficult to gauge. At the least, it
means that attachmentjurisdiction,

sions following Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67 (1972). At the same
time, the logic of the decision in
Shaffer v. Heitnerfairly implies that

the presence of a person, without
more, may no longer be a sufficient
basis for in personam jurisdiction.

with Washington ex rel. Bond &
Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Washington for Spokane

County, 289 U.S. 361 (1933) (service
on statutory "agent" of foreign corporation held to be valid). But seasonably it was settled that substituted service in actions in personam
was effective only ifit had a substantial likelihood of conferring actual
notice. See Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
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U.S. 306,314 (1950), and Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306

In proceedings in rem, the ques- (1950), and cases following it, the
tion of notice historically was more notice requirement was radically
troublesome. Hazard, A General modified. Mullane held that even
Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, when jurisdiction was based on pres1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241. In principle ence of property and the proceedit had long been recognized that ing was one in rem, the notice
reasonable notice was a fundamen- procedure had to be "reasonably
tal element of procedural fairness. certain to inform those affected."
On the other hand, the theory that a 339 U.S. at 315. As the law has since
court could not exercise authority developed, there remain a few unbeyond its territorial limits created settled questions in the application
difficulty in giving effect to this of this principle. For example, it has
principle. When the owner or claim- been argued that notice need not be
ant of the property was within given of proceedings of which the
the state's territorial jurisdiction, person to be notified is almost cernotice could be directed to him and tain to become otherwise aware,
most in rem procedures required such as property tax foreclosures
something of the sort. Owners against the person responsible for
or claimants outside the territory, paying the tax. It is settled, howhowever, were regarded as out- ever, that notice need not actually
side the range of the court's legal be conveyed to the persen involved;
reach; to require that they re- it is enough that the procedure
ceive official notice would have vio- yields a high probability of giving
lated the premise that a state actual notice.
could not exercise legal authority
Under the modern interpretation
outside its boundaries. Moreover, of the Due Process Clause, it therethe authors of state legislation pre- fore can be said that fair notice has
scribing the notice requirements become at least as important in the
in proceedings in rem were per- hierarchy of legal values as the
haps not fully sensitive to the principle of territorial jurisdiction.
interests of non-residents. Instead, The requirement of territorial juristhe fiction was indulged that the diction was always one that could be
property was in the hands of a waived, except perhaps in limited
custodian who would warn the classes of cases such as divorce
owner if the property were seized in proceedings. No transcending publegal proceedings. Seizure of the lic policy required observance of
property was thereby treated as territorial jurisdictional limits when
giving notice to interested persons. a party saw fit not to raise an
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jurisdiction, the parties do not inevitably waive it by litigating the
merits and the court may raise the
question on its own motion. The
classifications arrived at by the
courts do not appear to be wholly
UBJECT MATTER JURISDICconsistent. Compare GranvilleSmith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1
TION o The term subject
matterjurisdictionrefers to (1955), with Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
the rules that invest a particular U.S. 343 (1948).
This question of classification ilcourt or other tribunal with authority to decide various kinds of legal lustrates the most important res
controversies. That authority is also judicata problem posed by the rules
sometimes referred to as compe- of subject matter jurisdictiontence or competency. See Restate- whether a judgment rendered withment (Second) of Conflict of Laws out objection to subject matter
§ 92 (1971).
jurisdiction may thereafter be chalWhatever term is used, the con- lenged on the ground that the court
cept of authority to decide a particu- lacked such jurisdiction. The tradilar type of legal controversy is tional doctrine, by no means consissometimes difficult or impossible to tently applied in the cases, was that
distinguish from that of territorial a judgment could always be so atjurisdiction. For example, when tacked. The doctrine rested on the
reference is made to a court's au- principle that a judgment of a court
thority to determine a matter of lacking any pretense to authority is a
status or interests in property, it can legal nullity. That principle is sound.
be said that the state's connection to But the principle does not entail
the status or the property is a matter some of the corollaries often asof territorial jurisdiction or of sub- sociated with it, for example, that a
ject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, judgment is no less a nullity because
sometimes the distinction can be the court appeared to have subject
intelligently made only by consider- matter jurisdiction on the facts preation of the differences in conse- sented to it. The problem remains of
quence that follow from the classifi- striking the proper balance between
cation. If the matter is regarded as the principle that the authority of a
one of territorial jurisdiction, it is judgment depends on the authority
waived by the parties if they do not of the court that rendered it and the
make proper threshold objection in principle that ajudgment ought to be
the original action. If the matter is final when fair opportunity to litigate
regarded as one of subject matter has been afforded.

objection concerning them. On the
other hand, the Mullane principle
has transformed the notice requirement from a formality into an essential.
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